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In this paper I explore the relationship between the sales tax rate and
the tax treatment of food in American states. One of the main diﬃculties
in the empirical estimation of this relationship is that state governments
set the two tax policy variables. This produces a potential endogeneity
problem that would bias the estimates if not considered. I use instrumen-
tal variables to solve the problem and to identify the eﬀect of the sales
tax rate on the probability of having a food exemption. The empirical
results show that, on average, a one percentual point increase in the sales
tax rate increases by 20% the probability of having a food exemption.
JEL: H71, H73
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The optimal tax literature, in general, does not predict a food exemption
as an optimal solution when implementing a sales tax. Ramsey optimal tax
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1rules, for example, suggests that food should be taxed more heavily because its
demand is probably more inelastic.
If distributional considerations and individual endowments are introduced
to Ramsey model, then the compensated reduction in demand with the optimal
tax structure is smaller: (1) the more the good is consumed by individuals with
a high net social marginal utility of income; (2) the more the good is consumed
by households with a high marginal propensity to consume taxed goods. A
commodity with a low elasticity of demand should have a high tax on eﬃciency
grounds, but since the consumption of such a commodity rises only slowly with
wages, it should have a low tax for equity reasons (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)).
Which of the two factors dominates depend on the social welfare function and
on the shape of the distribution of abilities.
Even though exempting food from sales taxes is a bad idea on eﬃciency
grounds1, the majority of the States have a special tax treatment for food.There
are many good reasons to think that the food exemptions have a strong impact
on the sales tax revenue and rate.
Due and Mikesell (1994), for example, consider that the food exemptions
costs a state from 20% to 25% of sales and use tax revenue, which means they
have to increase the tax rate by 1% to compensate for the loss of revenue. How-
ever, the scarce empirical evidence available does not support the idea of an
impact of the food exemption on the yield of the sales tax or the sales tax rate.
Merriman and Skidmore (1997) estimate the impact of the food exemption on
1See for example Iorwerth and Whalley (1998).
2the yield of the sales tax (revenue/tax rate) and their results show no signif-
icance. Bahl and Hawkins (1997) believe the evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that food exemption lead states to raise the sales tax rate, but their
empirical results did not conﬁrm the hypothesis.
One possible explanation for these empirical results is reverse causality,
namely, sales tax rates cause a food exemption. I explore this possibility in
this paper using data for American states for the period 1977-1998.
2 Could Higher Sales Tax Rates Cause a Food
Exemption?
One of the main sources of tax revenue for state governments is the sales
tax and states face some exogenous shocks that aﬀect negatively the collections.
There are several examples of exogenous shocks that have decreased the sales
tax revenues. In the case of sales taxes, concrete examples of negative shocks are
the eﬀects of internet sales and the increase in household spending on services,
which are mainly not taxed.2 The impact of some of these shocks might be quite
signiﬁcant, the estimated total state and local revenue loss due to e-commerce,
for example, was $13.3 billion for 2001 (Bruce and Fox (2001)). Then, if state
governments want to keep providing the same level of public goods and services,
they must compensate the eﬀects of these shocks increasing the revenue collected
either from the sales tax or from other taxes.
2Between 1970 and 2001, consumption of services rose from 31% to 44% of total household
purchases.
3Additionally, states face some pressure to increase revenue for two reasons.
First, to counterbalance the declines in federal expenditures; and, second, to
meet citizens demands for reductions in property taxes subsidized by higher
state funding of local expenditures.
For any of these reasons, state goverments may need/want to increase the
sales tax rate. However, there are some political costs of raising another dollar of
revenues3 and, in this particular case, they might be higher because the sales tax
is seen as being regressive (the relative size of the consumption budget decreases
as income increases). A state government would try to minimize the political
costs of raising the sales tax rate and enacting a food exemption might be a way
of doing it.
Allowing a food exemption would make the sales tax less regressive.4 It
is not clear that this would be the case because, among other things, a food
exemption favors persons with relatively high preferences for expensive food
and poor households already receive food stamps, which are exempted from
sales taxes.5 Still, the food exemption might be considered a political winner
because potentially reduces the regressivity of the sales tax and provides relief
to almost every voter.6
3These costs represent the loss in electoral support for the government from levying
taxation.
4Data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey suggest that households earning less than
$30,000 (in 2003 dollars) spend basically all of their income while households with incomes
above $200,000 spend around 37%.
5On November 23, 1985, the U.S. senate passed a bill that prohibited states and local
governments to impose sales tax on purchases of food made with coupons issued under the
food stamp program. The provision has been eﬀective since october 1, 1986.
6Empirically, a food exemption has not been always a political winner. Voters of Idaho,
Nevada, and South Dakota rejected an exemption for food in 1984, 1982, and 2004 respectively.
Tennessee repealed on June 1 of 1985 legislation that had previously enacted a phasing out
4Therefore, a policy instrument like a food exemption may arise as a result
of the pursuit of political goals. In fact, many of the complexities of a tax
system, including exemptions, can be explained using models that assumed
self-interested decision making in both the private and public sectors (Hettich
and Winer (1988), Warskett et al (1998)). A support maximizing government
would equalize the change in expected political support per dollar of additional
revenue across revenue sources. As a result, support-maximizing governments
would create tax structures that deviate from the solutions in the optimal tax
literature.
A food exemption adds complexity to the sales tax structure, but state gov-
ernments have incentives to increase the complexity of the tax system because
the additional complexity, when properly used, allows the government to mini-
mize the adverse political response of taxpayers to the increased tax burden on
them. The analysis of these type of models then, suggests that a broad-based
sales tax without special provisions might not be compatible with dynamic po-
litical competition in states with hetereogenous individuals.
An increase in the sales tax rate can cause a food exemption because the
latter reduces the political cost of the former. A food exemption, for example,
might be a political concession of the state government to legislators in exchange
for the approval of a sales tax rate increase.
its tax on food. The rate would had decreased from 5.5 to 3.75 in June 1985 and to 2% in
June 1986. After may 1987, food would had been exempted.
53 Estimation and Results
3.1 Instrumental Variables
One of the main problems for identifying the eﬀects of the sales tax rate on
the existence of food exemptions is that state governments set them both. Em-
pirically, the enactment of a food exemption has been almost always a one time
event in each state that has one. The eﬀect of this empirical regularity is that
there is much more variation in the tax rates than in the food exemptions, which
makes look the sales tax rate as an exogenous variable in the determination of
the tax treatment of food. However, there is still a potential endogeneity that
has to be considered. State governments do have the possibility of changing the
tax treatment of food every period and few of them, like Louisiana and North
Carolina, have actually done it.
One possible solution for the endogeneity problem is to use instrumental
variables. This solution requires, in this case, to ﬁnd a variable that is strongly
correlated with the sales tax rate and not correlated with unobserved determi-
nants of the food exemption.
The sales tax is a tax that is paid not only by the citizens of the state
that uses the tax, but also by citizens from other states or countries who are
visiting and consuming in the state. Therefore, the burden of the sales tax
is somehow exported and states that received more tourists do so in greater
proportion than states with less tourists.7 Then, states with higher tourism
7Pollock (1991), for example, estimates that Connecticut is able to export roughly 22% of
its total sales tax burden.
6levels can have higher sales tax rates without increasing the burden of the tax
on their own citizens. As a result, I would expect that states in which tourism
is an important fraction of the state economy will have higher sales tax rates.
A variable that measures tourism in a state should therefore be highly corre-
lated with the sales tax rate. I use the fraction of state product from hotels and
accommodations (SIC code 70) as an instrument for the sales tax rate.8 Id o
believe that this instrument is exogenous with respect to food exemptions. One
possible story that would break the exogeneity would be that tourists consume
mainly food in the state they visit and if states want to export the burden of
the sales tax they should not exempt food from the sales tax. According to
this story, it would be less likely that states with higher levels of tourism have
a food exemption. However, the food exemptions enacted in all states exempt
only food for home consumption and not meals, which are what tourists mainly
consume. Therefore, food exemptions beneﬁt mainly the residents of each state.
The use of the fraction of GSP that comes from lodging as an instrumental vari-
able for the sales tax then, allows to identify the eﬀe c t so ft h es a l e st a xo nt h e
probability of having a food exemption.9
8There exist some alternative proxies for the state sales to foreign citizens that I was not
able to use. The Travel Industry Association of America, for example, calculates the impact
of international visitor spending on state economies, but it is available for only few years. The
Census Bureau reports the number of visitors each state receives, but is available only for
some states and also for few years.
9One potential concern with the use of this instrument is that the fraction of GSP from
hotels and lodging can be capturing several things non related at all with the actual number
of visitors or the expenditures of foreign citizens in each state. As a way to explore this
possibility I ran a regression using the fraction of GSP from lodging as a dependent variable
and the other measures described in the previous footnote (international travel expenditures,
number of international visitors) for which I have few observations. The results show that the
fraction of GSP from hotels is not only strongly and positively correlated with these alternative
measures, but it also explains around 45% of the variation.
73.2 Data
I collected data from diﬀerent sources for the 50 U.S. states during the period
1977-1998. Table (1) presents summary statistics of the data.
The variable sales tax rate is the statutory state sales tax rate. There are ﬁve
states that do not have sales tax: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire,
and Oregon; and there are ﬁve states that never changed its sales tax rate over
this period: Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Sales Tax Rate 0.047 0.011 0.02 0.08 1012
Food Exemption 0.591 0.492 0 1 1012
Unemployment 0.064 0.021 0.025 0.18 1012
Poverty 0.140 0.043 0.029 0.326 1012
Elder 65 0.121 0.019 0.071 0.186 1012
Income p.c. 16253 6242.05 5259 37338 1012
Population 5210.31 5367.43 411.53 32987.7 1012
Democrat 0.446 0.093 0.205 0.853 1012
Revenue Limit 0.110 0.314 0 1 1012
Expenditure Limit 0.305 0.461 0 1 1012
Food Stamps 0.084 0.034 0.016 0.23 1012
GSP Hotels 0.011 0.020 0.0027 0.151 1012
The variable Food Exemption is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state
exempts (fully or partially) food from sales tax. At the beginning of the sample
period (January 1, 1977), there were 19 of the 45 states using sales tax ex-
empting food and by the end of the sample period (December 31, 1998), there
were 30. Twelve states enacted a food sales tax exemption during this period:
Arizona (July 1,1980), Colorado (January 1, 1980), Georgia (1996)10, Illinois
10The sales tax on food was phased out between October 1, 1996, when the rate was reduced
for food from 4% to 2%, and October 1, 1998, when the rate was zero.
8(January 1,1980)11, Michigan (1978), Missouri (1997)12,N e b r a s k a( O c t o b e r1 ,
1983), Nevada (July 1,1979), North Carolina (1997)13, South Dakota (May 1,
1980)14, Washington (July 1,1978)15, and West Virginia (1979)16;a n dt w os t a t e s
repealed the food exemption: Louisiana (1993-97)17 and West Virginia (1990)
Figure 1 shows the number of states with food exemptions during the period
1977-1998.18
The variable Income per capita is the state personal income per capita in
dollars, as calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, deﬂated by the U.S.
GDP price deﬂator. The variable unemployment is the state unemployment
rate as percentage of the civilian labor force, estimated by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
The variables poverty, population and elder 65 are the percentage of persons
in the state below the poverty level, the state population in thousands, and the
percentage of the population above 65 years old, respectively, all of them as
estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau.
11It reduced the rate on food 1% in 1980 and then an additonal 1% on January 1, 1981.
12On October 1, 1997, the tax rate on food was reduced from 4.225% to 1.225.
13Eﬀective January 1, 1997 until June 30, 1998, the state tax rate was reduced to 3% for
purchases of food for home consumption. Then, from July 1, 1998 until April 30, 1999, it was
reduced to 2%. Finally, on May 1, 1999, the sales tax on food was repealed.
14It increased the sales tax rate 1% for one year, but kept the tax on food constant.
15The exemption was temporarily suspended from May 1, 1982, through June 30, 1983.
16It reduced the rate 1% each year starting in 1979. The food exemption was then repealed
in 1990.
17Between 1986 and 1993 the food exemption was partially repealed and food was taxed at
lower rates: 1% between July, 1986, and June, 1989; 3% between July, 1989 and December
1989; 2% between January, 1990, and June 1990; and 3% between July 1990, and June 1993
(the general sales tax rate was 4% throughout this period). The exemption was then fully
repealed during the period July, 1993, and June, 1997. Since July, 1997, and until June, 2000,
food was taxed at a lower rate again (3% while the sales tax rate was 4%).
18The main source for these data is the Federation of Tax Administrators. However, due
to some inconsistencies with other sources I contacted state revenue authorities of Iowa,
Louisiana, and Missouri to clarify the contradictions. Douglas A. Shackelford provided the
information for North Carolina.
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State governments face several statutory constraints when designing their
budgets. Several states face expenditures and/or revenue limitations, which
constrain the annual growth of them either to a ﬁxed rate or to one based on
one or more of the following variables: inﬂation rate, population growth, growth
of personal income, and ratio of revenue to personal income. Using information
from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the Book
of the States, I constructed two dummy variables for capturing the eﬀects of
these budget limits.
The variables Expenditure Limit and Revenue Limit are a dummy equal to
one if the state has a constitutional or statutory provision that constraints the
annual growth of expenditures or revenues respectively, and zero otherwise.
10The variable Food Stamps is the fraction of the population using food stamps
in each state. It is constructed dividing the number of persons participating in
the program, as reported by the Food and Nutrition Service (U.S. Department
of Agriculture), by the total population of each state according to the Census
Bureau.
3.3 Results
Table (2) presents the results of the estimation using pooled data for the
period 1980-1998, after dropping from the sample all the states that have no
sales tax. The dependent variable is equal to one if the state has a full or partial
sales tax exemption for food and zero otherwise. Model (1) shows the Probit
estimation just as a comparison to the instrumental variables estimation. The
coeﬃcient of the sales tax rate is positive and signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀect
calculated at the average of the sample is 16.1, which means that a 1 percentual
point increase in the sales tax rate increases the probability of having a food
exemption by around 16 percentual points.
Model (2) shows the IV-Probit estimation, where the fraction of the state
product from hotels and accommodations is used as an instrumental variable for
the sales tax rate. The coeﬃcient of the tax rate is again positive and signiﬁcant,
but much larger in magnitude. The marginal eﬀect calculated at the average
of the sample is now 21.2, which implies that a 1 percentual point increase in
the sales tax rate increases the probability of having a food exemption by 21
percentual points. As can be seen from the comparison of the Probit estimation
11with the Probit-IV estimation, the endogeneity of the sales tax rate downward
biases the estimated coeﬃcient. However, this bias is not large when looking
at the marginal eﬀects, the diﬀerence between the two is about 5 percentual
points.
The coeﬃcient of the poverty rate is negative and signiﬁcant at 10%. I
expected a positive coeﬃcient for this variable, especially if one of the reasons
why states have enacted food exemptions is to make the sales tax less regressive.
One possible explanation is that poverty rate is not really well measured and it
does not vary much from year to year.19 To explore this possibility I decided
to use the fraction of people using food stamps in each state. Even though this
variable is just a proxy for poverty, it is accurately measured because it is the
actual count of people receiving food stamps in each state. Model (3) uses food
stamp beneﬁts per capita as a measure for poverty instead of using the poverty
rate. The coeﬃcient on this variable is also negative, but not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
Model (4) includes both measures of poverty, the poverty rate and the food
stamp beneﬁts per capita, and also adds some statutory and constitutional
budget constraints that states face.
The coeﬃcient on the sales tax rate is again positive, signiﬁcant and about
the same magnitude that in the previous two speciﬁcations. The marginal eﬀect
of the sales tax rate is now 26 percentual points at the means of the sample.
Figure 2 shows the marginal eﬀect of the sales tax rate on the probability on
19The poverty rate is estimated from annual surveys and then adjusted by the Census data
every ten years.
12Table 2: Pooled Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales Tax Rate 50.40 83.56 80.64 82.17
(19.57) (24.35) (22.41) (23.34)
Poverty -14.48 -8.91 -7.35
(4.802) (4.84) (4.11)
Income p.c. 0.0000015 0.00027 0.00033 0.00026
(0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Population 0.00012 0.00008 0.00007 0.00008
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Elder 65 10.25 15.89 14.96 10.98
(9.36) (9.44) (9.20) (9.26)
Unemployment 18.77 16.56 16.45 13.79
(5.321) (7.11) (7.43) (7.08)






Constant -6.35 -6.36 -7.73 -6.21
(1.275) (1.611) (1.72) (1.70)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Log Likelihood -424.39 -401.39 -407.82 -387.24
Wald Chi2 350.57 385.24 296.48 424.5
N 1012 1012 1012 1012
having a food exemption for the whole range of sales tax rates. As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, there is a wide range of marginal eﬀects. A sales tax rate of 2%
increases the probability of a food exemption by around 5 percentual points.
The marginal eﬀect increases then up to 32 percentual points for a tax rate of
4.5%, and then decreases dramatically for higher tax rates. For a tax rate of
8%, the highest sales tax rate in the sample, the probability of having a food
exemption increases only by 0.5 percentual points.
The coeﬃcient of unemployment is positive and marginally signiﬁcant at
5%. The marginal eﬀects of unemployment and poverty are 4.5 and -2.4 per-


























centual points, respectively. Therefore a one percentual point increase in the
unemployment and the poverty rates are associated, on average, to a 4.5 and
2.4 percentual points increase and decreased in the probability of having a food
exemption, respectively.
The coeﬃcient on the fraction of elder people is positive, but not signiﬁcant.
The marginal eﬀect of the fraction of elder people is 3.5 percentual points.
In general, I would expect states with a higher fraction of elder people in the
population have lower sales tax rates. The reason for this is that elder people are
consuming most of their income (and probably their savings too) and therefore
they would prefer low sales taxes (and probably high income taxes because their
14current income is low).20 For the same reasons I expected that a state with a
higher fraction of elder people would be more likely to have a food exemption,
a n di nt h a ts e n s et h eo b s e r v e dp o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient is the expected sign even
though the non signiﬁcance is a surprise. It is diﬃcult to know if this is due to
the lack of cross-sectional variation on the data or because there is no actual
relationship between the food exemption and the fraction of elder people in a
state.
The coeﬃcients on population and income per capita are both positive and
signiﬁcant and their marginal eﬀects at the means are 0.0025 and 0.008 per-
centual points. It is true that these eﬀects are quite small, even though signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero, but it is interesting that states with higher population
levels and/or higher income per capita are more likely to have a food exemption.
I did not have a prior for these two variables. It is possible that wealthier states
care less about poor people and therefore is less likely that they will have a
food exemption. Alternatively, they might care more about poverty and they
can also aﬀord a better welfare system, in which case it is also less likely that
they will enact a food exemption. A potential explanation for the positive sign
observed is that wealthier states want to keep corporate and personal income
taxes low, so they ﬁnance the provision of public goods using sales tax and, due
to political pressure, allow a food exemption in exchange for a higher sales tax
rate.
20There is some anecdotal evidence that supports this claim. In November 9, 1993, for
example, Oregon voters turned down a sales tax proposal and senior citizens groups were
amongst the groups that strongly opposed the measure.
15I also considered the following variables that might aﬀect the tax setting
decision of a state government: amount of federal grants per capita, percentage
of the state population voting democrat in the closest presidential election, the
ratio of state debt to state product, state debt per capita, the fraction of the
population that are high school graduates, and a dummy variable equal to one
if the state has a statutory or constitutional provision requiring a supermajority
voting to increase taxes. However, they were never signiﬁcant and the results
were basically identical if they were included or not, so I decided to drop them
from the ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
One of the potential problems in the previous analysis is that there is not
enough time variation to include state ﬁxed eﬀects. If the omitted state ﬁx
eﬀects are correlated with the sales tax rate, the estimated coeﬃcients are bi-
ased. The use of instrumental variables eliminates this bias. However, there are
others explanatory variables that might be correlated with state ﬁxed eﬀects
(poverty for example). As a feasible alternative to control for state ﬁxed eﬀects
Id i ﬀerenced the data, using only the ﬁrst and the ast year of the sample for
this purpose.
Table 3 presents the results of the long diﬀerence estimation (year 1998
minus year 1977). As can be seen from the table, the estimated coeﬃcient are
very similar in sign and magnitude to the previous estimates. However, as it
is expected, the standard errors are much larger. Again, just for comparison
with the Instrumental Variables estimation, column (1) shows the results of the
Probit estimation. The coeﬃcient of the sales tax rate is positive, but signiﬁcant
16only at 10%. The marginal eﬀect of the sales tax rate on the probability of
having a food exemption is 13.64 percentual points at the means of the sample.
Model (2) shows the IV-Probit estimation. The coeﬃcient of the sales tax rate
is again positive, but now signiﬁcant at 5%. Now, the marginal eﬀect of the
sales tax rate, at sample means, is 22.7 percentual points.
Table 3: Long Diﬀerence Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales Tax Rate 54.94 88.62 84.11 87.02
(30.21) (38.64) (37.56) (38.14)
Poverty 4.244 4.74 1.64
(2.78) (2.91) (2.81)
Income p.c. 0.00005 0.00008 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007)
Population 0.00009 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00007)
Elder 65 41.33 34.92 36.11 30.25
(25.76) (24.99) (24.60) (24.02)
Unemployment 29.48 30.14 39.91 42.12
(20.00) (21.05) (24.09) (21.64)






Constant -2.23 -3.27 -5.11 -5.27
(1.72) (1.93) (1.84) (2.01)
Log Likelihood -20.148 -20.68 -19.51 -18.99
Wald Chi2 7.96 9.42 10.91 11.18
N 4 64 64 64 6
The coeﬃcient on Poverty now has a positive sign, which is the one I ex-
pected, even though is only signiﬁcant at the % conﬁdence level in the ﬁrst two
models and not signiﬁcant in model (4). The rest of the coeﬃcients are similar
in magnitude to the previous ones and they have the same sign, therefore, I
17do not think is relevant to discuss them in detail. However, it is important to
mention that, due to the reduction in the degrees of freedom and the consequent
increase in the standard errors, some of them are now non signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
4 Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper I have explored the impact of the sales tax rate on the proba-
bility of having a food exemption. One of the main diﬃculties in the analysis is
that state governments set both the sales tax rate and the exemptions, which
causes an endogeneity problem when trying to estimate the eﬀects of one of the
tax policy variables on the other one. Using instrumental variables for the tax
rate to solve the endogeneity problem, I obtain consistent estimates of the eﬀect
of the tax rate on the probability of having a food exemption. The empirical
results show a strong positive correlation between the sales tax rate and the
existence of a food exemption. A one percentual point increase in the statutory
sales tax rate increases the probability of having a food exemption between 20
and 25 percentual points, on average.
It would be interesting to estimate the eﬀects of the food exemption on the
sales tax rate. A suitable instrument for the food exemption is required for that
purpose.
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